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Is Death Bad for a Cow? 
Ben Bradley 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Whether death is bad for a cow seems to be determined by what sort of mental 
lives cows have. The Sunday Times reports: “cows have a secret mental life in which they 
bear grudges, nurture friendships and become excited over intellectual challenges, 
scientists have found.”1 If cows have friends, bear grudges, and get excited over 
intellectual challenges, then they have mental lives of some sort.  But this does not by 
itself settle the question of whether death is bad for cows, or whether we may permissibly 
kill them.  Some allege that while cows have some mental states, they do not have the 
ones that are required in order for death to be bad for them.  In what follows I will 
evaluate these claims. Since our knowledge about cows’ mental lives may change over 
time, and we might come to discover that they are more or less sophisticated than we now 
think, my arguments will not turn on our current understanding of cows, but rather on 
more general connections between value and mental capacities. I will sometimes grant 
my opponents pessimistic and perhaps unwarranted assumptions about cow psychology 
in order to focus on these general connections. 
There is a straightforward argument for the conclusion that death is bad for cows 
in at least some instances.2  It goes like this: 
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1. Death is bad for an individual if and only if it makes that individual’s lifetime well-
being level lower than it would otherwise have been. 
2. Death sometimes makes a cow’s lifetime well-being level lower than it would have 
been. 
3. Therefore, death is sometimes bad for a cow. 
 
The first premise is just a statement of a generic deprivation account of the badness of 
death.3  The feature of this statement that is crucial for our purposes is the employment of 
the notion of a lifetime well-being level.  Your lifetime well-being level is the value for 
you of your whole life. 
 The second premise might be justified in a number of ways.  Let us suppose that 
among the goods of life is pleasure, and among the bads of life is pain.  Almost everyone 
thinks this is true, even if most think that other things are good and bad as well.  Cows 
can experience pleasure and pain.  If pleasure is among the goods of life, then, ceteris 
paribus, when a cow gets more pleasure, its lifetime well-being level is higher.  Death 
deprives at least some cows of a future that contains some pleasures and comparatively 
less pain.  For those cows, death makes the cow’s lifetime well-being level lower than it 
would have been if the cow had survived. 
Those who argue that death is not bad for cows can be divided into those that 
reject premise 1, and those that reject premise 2.  Those who reject premise 1 claim that it 
is not enough that death makes its victim’s lifetime well-being level lower than it would 
have been; something else, in addition to (or instead of) deprivation, is required for death 
to be a misfortune.  Those who reject premise 2 claim that cows do not have lifetime 
In Tatjana Višak and Robert Garner (eds.), The Ethics of Killing Animals (Oxford University Press), pp. 51-64.  
 
 
 3 
well-being levels at all.  I will consider these responses in turn.  But first let me mention 
some responses to this argument that I won’t be discussing here. 
Epicurus and Lucretius are famous for giving arguments for the claim that death 
is not bad for people.  Epicurus argued that death is not bad for us because when death 
comes, we no longer exist, so there is no subject of harm (Epicurus 1964, 54).  Lucretius 
argued that death is not bad for us because a future in which we do not exist is relevantly 
like a past in which we do not exist, and since it is not bad to be born later than we might 
have been, it is also not bad to die earlier (Lucretius 1965, 110).  Some contemporary 
philosophers find these arguments compelling (e.g. Rorty 1983). If sound, they might 
provide reason to reject premise one.  I’m not going to address those arguments here.  I’m 
supposing that there is no general problem with saying that death is bad.  What I’m 
interested in is the idea that although death is bad for some individuals, such as most 
adult humans, it’s not bad for cows. 
 Pessimists such as David Benatar argue that no actual person lives a life that is 
worth living on the whole.  Life is full of pain.  We get sick, we get hungry and tired, we 
spend great amounts of our lives in discomfort of some sort.  Many of us think that the 
good times in life make it worthwhile to have been born, but we are wrong (Benatar 2006 
Ch. 3). I think if Benatar is right we have good reason to reject premise two, as long as 
cows are like humans in the relevant respects.  I see no reason to think he is right, but I 
don’t wish to discuss this here, because again, if he is right, it would mean that death is 
not bad for anybody, whether human or not. 
 Finally, I will not here discuss the views of those who think that non-humans do 
not matter at all, morally speaking.  As far as I can tell, none of the philosophers to whom 
In Tatjana Višak and Robert Garner (eds.), The Ethics of Killing Animals (Oxford University Press), pp. 51-64.  
 
 
 4 
I am responding think that animal suffering does not matter.  For example, Ruth Cigman 
argues that we have no obligation not to kill animals painlessly, but nevertheless “we 
have an obligation not to inflict gratuitous suffering on animals” (Cigman 1981, 50).  The 
thought is that there is something special about death, in virtue of which while it may be 
very bad for a cow to be tortured, it is not bad for it to die. 
 
II.  The Desire for Life and the Badness of Death 
 
 Chris Belshaw claims that “a desire for life is necessary if death is to be bad” 
(2009, 115).  He qualifies this claim in an important way, as we will see.  But if Belshaw 
is right, the deprivation account of death’s badness is false, and the argument fails.  
Further, if cows lack a desire to live, then death is not bad for them. 
Do cows desire to live? According to PETA’s website, “cows value their lives and 
don’t want to die.”4  It is unclear what the basis for this claim is, but the website also 
recounts a story about a cow that jumped over a fence while being led to the 
slaughterhouse, and ran a long way away.  It was then given sanctuary by an animal 
rights group.  Does this cow’s quest for freedom show that the cow wanted to live?  I 
think this is a reasonable explanation of the cow’s behavior. Behavior can only constitute 
prima facie evidence of desires, but as Mary Midgley argues, given what we know about 
similarities between the biological and social characteristics of humans and other 
animals, “reasons must be found for refusing to say” that animals lack the mental states 
humans have (Midgley 1983: 134).5 
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While I am intrigued by the question of whether cows have desires and which 
ones they have, I am more interested in the claim that a desire to live is necessary for 
death to be bad. Belshaw offers no argument for the claim.  Of course, desire-based views 
of value are popular, so the claim might be motivated by some such general view about 
value.  But even if a desire-based view of value were true, death could still be bad for an 
individual that lacked a desire to live.  If that individual had other desires that would be 
frustrated by death, death could be bad for her.  So why think that this one particular 
desire is necessary? 
Perhaps the answer can be found in a distinction between types of desires.  
Belshaw says that what is really required for death to be bad is not a desire to live, but a 
categorical desire.6  Here Belshaw follows Bernard Williams, who introduced the notion 
of a categorical desire in his famous 1973 paper “The Makropulos Case.”  A categorical 
desire is supposed to be one that is not conditional on being alive, and therefore can 
provide both motivation and justification to continue living. 
What is it for a desire to be conditional on being alive? To understand this, we 
must understand the nature of conditional desire.  It seems that many desires have 
conditions – we want something on the condition that some other thing is the case. 
Charlton wants to eat the soylent green later on the condition that he is hungry later; if he 
is not hungry later, then not having some soylent green doesn’t frustrate his desire for 
soylent green. Or, Charlton wants to eat the soylent green later on the condition that 
soylent green is something permissible to eat; even if he eats the soylent green later, his 
desire won’t be fulfilled, because soylent green is people. In these cases, a desire is 
conditional on something that fails to obtain.  When this happens, the desire is neither 
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satisfied nor frustrated; it is cancelled (McDaniel and Bradley 2008).  It is, in one way, as 
if the desire never happened. 
If this is right, then a categorical desire might be understood to be a desire such 
that if the desirer were to die, the desire would not thereby be cancelled.  And we might 
think, therefore, that some such desire is necessary in order for death to be bad for its 
victim – at least, this is what Williams and Belshaw conclude.  If someone had no 
categorical desires, then upon death all of that person’s desires would be cancelled; thus 
death would frustrate no desires of the person who dies.  The following sort of example is 
supposed to illustrate how this might happen.  Someone is very tired of living, and is 
confined to her bed, but still desires that someone bring her some painkillers.  Why?  She 
wants the painkillers, but only on the condition that she is still alive.  The painkillers are 
not motivating her to stay alive, nor giving her any reason to stay alive.  If all her desires 
were like that, and she were to die, we might say that she is no worse off than she would 
have been if she had lived and had the painkillers. 
So now our questions are: can cows have categorical desires, and are categorical 
desires really necessary for death to be bad? 
I see no reason to think that cows cannot have categorical desires, provided they 
can have desires at all.  Suppose a cow sees some grass and forms a desire to eat it; while 
it is moving towards the grass, it is hit by a cannonball and dies instantly.  Was the cow’s 
desire for the grass conditional on being alive, like the desire for painkillers in the case of 
the person who is tired of living?  This is implausible. There is no reason to think that the 
cow wants the grass on the condition that it is alive.  It just wants the grass.  Its desire 
does not seem to be conditional on anything at all. Those who are suspicious of the 
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mental lives of cows should, if anything, be more suspicious that they have conditional 
desires than that they have categorical ones. 
Are categorical desires necessary for death to be bad? The first thing to note is 
that this claim requires the truth of a desire-based theory of well-being.  I think these 
theories are false, but right now we’re not going to settle which is the correct theory of 
well-being.  So let us suppose for now that some desire-based theory of well-being is 
true, so that differences in well-being must be explained by appeal to differences in the 
satisfaction or frustration of desires.  We have now seen that there is a third thing that can 
happen to a desire: it can be cancelled.  According to a desire-based theory, it is a good 
thing to have one’s desires satisfied, and a bad thing to have them frustrated.  What about 
having a desire cancelled? The natural thing to say is that it is neither good nor bad when 
a desire is cancelled. It is as if the desire never happened. Now suppose that death cancels 
some non-categorical desire that would have been satisfied if the victim had not died.  
Isn’t it then bad for the victim to have died?  After all, it deprives the victim of the 
goodness of having a desire satisfied.  Preventing the satisfaction of a desire, by 
cancelling it, is a bad thing, even if it is not as bad as frustrating the desire. 
In the case of the person who has tired of living, it seems that death is not a bad 
thing, even though death cancels a desire for painkillers that would have been satisfied if 
she had not died.  That is not because her desire for painkillers is not categorical, but 
rather because her desire is an extrinsic desire.  She desires painkillers on the condition 
that getting them is necessary to relieve her pain, which we may suppose she desires 
intrinsically.  Defenders of desire-based theories (e.g. Brandt 1979 and Heathwood 2005) 
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typically claim, for just this reason, that it is only intrinsic desires that affect well-being.  
Getting painkillers and dying are both ways to satisfy the intrinsic desire to avoid pain. 
So I suspect that a more plausible thought about desires and death is that an 
intrinsic desire is necessary for death to be bad; intrinsic desires are what the person who 
is tired of living lacks (beyond the desire to be free from pain, which is equally satisfied 
by dying). But cows can have intrinsic desires. They intrinsically desire grass – or eating 
grass, or the sensations they get from eating grass. And furthermore it is not clear that 
actually having an intrinsic desire is necessary for death to be bad. For suppose that the 
person who is tired of living would, if she survived just a few more days, develop some 
intrinsic desires for things, and that they would be satisfied.  If she dies before those 
desires form, isn’t that a misfortune for her?  After all, if she formed the desires and they 
were satisfied, this would be a good thing for her, so her death makes things go worse for 
her.  Why should we be so concerned with the desires the victim has at the time of death, 
and ignore the desires she would have had if she lived?7 
Another kind of desire that cows allegedly lack is desires about the future.  Cows 
are said to lack such desires because they lack the capacity to conceive of themselves as 
existing through time.  If a being cannot conceive of itself as existing through time, then 
it cannot conceive of its future, and so cannot have desires about it.  If a being can’t 
desire to have a certain sort of future, then it can’t have such desires frustrated.   So desire 
satisfactionists can argue that death is less bad for cows than for adult people, since the 
death of an adult person frustrates more desires than the death of a cow.  Here is what 
Peter Singer says about the distinction between beings that grasp their futures and those 
that don’t: 
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Those who understand that they exist over time can have preferences relating 
to the future, and those that cannot understand that they exist over time 
cannot.  Thus the former have more to lose than the latter, and so, other things 
being equal, it is worse to end its life. (Singer 1999, 310) 
 
Singer’s concern is with the wrongness of killing, not the badness of death for its 
victim.  What he says is correct; if we presuppose a desire- or preference-based theory of 
welfare, and if cows have no desires about their futures, the death of a cow is less bad 
than that of a typical adult human.  But why should we think cows lack these desires?8  
Wouldn’t the cow who sees some grass over on the hill, and walks over to the hill to eat 
the grass, have a desire to eat grass in the future that explains why it walks over to the 
hill?  Can a creature that has memories and anticipates things really be said to live purely 
“in the moment”?9 Singer and others might have in mind more distant future-directed 
desires, or desires that concern one’s life as a whole.  Cows do not put money into 401Ks, 
build bomb shelters or visit the dentist, as we do when thinking about our more distant 
futures.  As Belshaw says: “wanting a mate right now isn’t the same as, or the same sort 
of thing as, wanting to settle down and raise a family” (2012, 278). Perhaps humans have 
more future-directed desires than cows do. If so, then if some desire-based axiology is 
true, the death of a cow may typically be less bad than that of a human.  Nevertheless, the 
death of a cow may still be very bad for it, since, in addition to frustrating the perhaps 
limited number of future-directed desires it has when it dies, it prevents the cow from 
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forming and satisfying preferences in the future, and such satisfactions would be good for 
the cow.  So we need further argument to establish that a cow’s death is not bad for it. 
The story I have told about categorical desires makes it fairly easy to have a 
categorical desire.  Some seem to think it is much more difficult to have such desires.  
Here is what Ruth Cigman says: 
 
The subject of a categorical desire must either understand death as a condition which 
closes a possible future forever, and leaves behind one a world in which one has no 
part as an agent or conscious being of any sort; or he must grasp, and then reject, this 
conception of death, in favor of a belief in immortality. Either way, the radical and 
exclusive nature of the transition from life to death must be understood. (Cigman 58-
9) 
 
It is not clear why Cigman thinks having a categorical desire requires the desirer to 
understand death in this way.  But arguments about what a categorical desire is are not 
very interesting, because ‘categorical desire’ is just a technical term; we can consider her 
view on its own merits, whether or not we think of it as a view about categorical desire.  
Must one be capable of understanding death as forever closing a possible future in order 
for one’s death to be bad? This would entail that death is not at all bad for a toddler or 
infant (DeGrazia 1996, 237).  One can have a reason to live even if one does not 
understand that it is a reason to live, because one does not understand what it is to live or 
to die.  In general, it is just false that something cannot be bad for an individual unless 
that individual can understand why it is bad. 
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 Cigman’s view is strange in another way.  She says that in order for one’s death to 
be bad, one must believe either that death is the end or that there is an afterlife.  Well, at 
most one of these beliefs may be true.  Suppose that there is an afterlife.  Now consider 
someone who believes there isn’t one.  That person does not understand death at all.  He 
has a false belief about death.  Why would having this false belief satisfy a necessary 
condition for death to be bad? Or consider someone who truly believes in an afterlife, but 
has not grasped the possibility of death being the final end. According to Cigman’s view, 
that person’s death would not be bad for him; but why should grasping or considering a 
falsehood be necessary for death to be bad? Cigman’s thought might be that, whichever 
of these views is true, death is a “radical” transition; one need not have any particular 
view about what happens at death in order for one’s death to be bad, but one must at least 
think of death as involving a radical transition. But suppose Ann falsely believes death is 
a radical transition into an afterlife, and Beth falsely believes it is not a radical transition 
at all. Why should the difference in their false beliefs about death make any difference to 
whether their deaths are bad for them? 
I don’t think premise one can be undermined by appeal to a sort of desire that 
cows do not have.  Neither categorical desires, nor intrinsic desires, nor future-directed 
desires, nor a sophisticated understanding of the nature of death, are necessary for death 
to be bad. 
Here is another way we might try to undermine premise one.  We might think 
that, although the cow’s lifetime well-being level would be higher if it were to live, death 
is not bad for it because it is not connected in the right way to its future.  In particular, we 
might think that cows do not have sufficient psychological connectedness over time for 
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future goods and evils to matter to it. Future goods and evils would be, in a way, like 
goods and evils happening to other cows. Jeff McMahan holds a view like this, which he 
calls the Time-Relative Interest Account of the badness of death (2002, 105).  The rough 
idea of McMahan’s view is that when determining how bad some event is for an 
individual, we look not only at the goods the event deprives the victim from having, but 
also at how psychologically connected – via memories, desires, and the like –  the person 
is (or would have been) between the time of the event and the time the good would have 
been had.  If this view is correct, we might argue that death is not bad for cows because 
although a cow is deprived of some future goods by dying at time t, the cow’s death is 
not bad because, when we look at how things would have gone for the cow if it hadn’t 
died at time t, the cow at the time of the future goods would not have been 
psychologically connected to the cow at t.10 
This is not McMahan’s view about cows; he thinks death is bad for cows, just not 
as bad as it is for creatures that exhibit more psychological connectedness.  And it seems 
very implausible that cows have no psychological connectedness over time.  They engage 
in behaviors that take time to complete.  Once in a while they jump over fences to escape 
the slaughterhouse.  A creature that had no psychological connectedness over time would 
have a hard time doing such things.  So McMahan’s view is not going to help explain 
why death is not bad for a cow. 
 One might try to argue that although a cow’s death is bad for it, it is not as bad as 
the death of an adult human. McMahan’s view seems to have this implication if we make 
some assumptions about the psychological connectedness of cows over time.  We might 
also get this result from certain axiologies.  One who likes Mill’s distinction between 
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higher and lower pleasures might claim that cows don’t get any higher pleasures, so their 
lives are not as good as those of people, so their deaths are not so bad.  One who thinks 
achievement or knowledge are valuable might argue that cows do not achieve or know 
many things, and therefore their lives are not as good as those of people, so their deaths 
are not so bad.  It is a very difficult thing to compare the values of lives of members of 
different species.  I don’t know how to tell whether my dog is having a better life than 
mine or a worse life; I prefer my own life, but that is compatible with it being the case 
that his life is better for him than mine is for me. In thinking about this question, it is very 
difficult to be objective – almost all of us want to say that lives like ours are more 
valuable than the lives of very different kinds of things, at least in part because this 
justifies us giving preference to beings like us. Questions about interspecies comparisons 
of well-being are worth further exploration, but I won’t explore them here.11  Even if the 
death of a cow is not as bad as the death of a human, it might still be very bad for it, and 
we have seen no good reason to deny this so far. 
 
III.  Lifetime Well-being 
 
So far there is no good reason to reject premise one.  So let us move on to premise 
two.  The questions here are: what features must an individual have in order to have a 
lifetime well-being level, and do cows have those features?12 
On one view, to have a lifetime well-being level, one must merely have some 
momentary well-being levels, because an individual’s lifetime well-being is just the sum 
of her momentary well-being levels.  On this additive view, cows have lifetime well-
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being levels.  But this view is controversial.  One of the most forceful objections to the 
additive view is given by David Velleman. 
According to Velleman, momentary well-being and diachronic, lifetime well-
being are completely different things; cows have only momentary well-being, not lifetime 
well-being.  Lifetime well-being is not reducible to momentary well-being or even to 
facts about the arrangement of bits of momentary well-being (Velleman 1993, 343-6).  
Lifetime well-being is determined (at least partly) by facts about narrative structure, such 
as whether early sacrifices pay off later in life, whether projects succeed or fail, and so 
on.  For example, according to Velleman it is better for you to work out your marital 
difficulties, reconcile with your spouse, and live happily ever after, than it is to get 
divorced, meet someone new, and live happily ever after with that person.  The reason is 
that you have invested a lot of effort into the previous relationship, and your life is better 
if those efforts pay off, even if you’d be just as well-off at every moment if you started 
over with someone new.  Momentary well-being, on the other hand, is determined by 
facts about that particular moment, e.g. how pleased you are at that moment.  Thus well-
being is “radically divided” (Velleman 1993, 345).  There is a component determined by 
momentary facts, and a component determined by narrative facts. 
 Velleman also holds the following thesis about intrinsic value:  “unless a subject 
has the bare capacity, the equipment, to care about something under some conditions or 
other, it cannot be intrinsically good for him” (1993, 354-5).  Given this thesis and our 
supposition about the impoverished mental capacities of cows, it follows that cows have 
no lifetime well-being at all.  Cows cannot care about how their whole lives go; they can 
In Tatjana Višak and Robert Garner (eds.), The Ethics of Killing Animals (Oxford University Press), pp. 51-64.  
 
 
 15 
care at any given time only about how things go for them at that very time.  So cows do 
not have good lives, only good moments. 
 These theses about well-being form the basis for Velleman’s argument that death 
is not bad for cows, which goes as follows: 
 
There is no moment at which a cow can be badly off because of death, since 
(as Lucretius would put it) where death is, the cow is not; and if there is no 
moment at which a cow is harmed by death, then it cannot be harmed by death 
at all.  A premature death does not rob the cow of the chance to accumulate 
more momentary well-being, since momentary well-being is not cumulable 
for a cow; nor can a premature death detract from the value of the cow’s life 
as a whole, since a cow has no interest in its life as a whole, being unable to 
care about what sort of life it lives.  Of course, a person can care about what 
his life story is like, and a premature death can spoil the story of his life.  
Hence death can harm a person but it cannot harm a cow. (1993, 357) 
 
Velleman’s argument is complicated. Let us excise the portions that concern the 
metaphysics of death, since these are very difficult to deal with and not necessary for 
Velleman’s argument, as far as I can tell.13 Here is a simplified version of his argument: 
 
1. If death is bad for a cow, then death detracts from the lifetime well-being level of 
the cow. (This follows from the deprivation account of death’s badness.) 
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2. In order for something to detract from the lifetime well-being level of a cow, it 
must either bring it about that the cow accumulates less momentary well-
being, or it must negatively affect the cow’s life story in a way the cow cares 
about. 
3. Cows cannot accumulate well-being. 
4. Cows cannot care about their life stories. 
5. Therefore, death does not detract from the lifetime well-being level of a cow. 
6. Therefore, death is not bad for a cow. 
 
Both premises 3 and 4 are justified by the same consideration: cows have no 
concept of themselves existing through time; they cannot grasp their whole lives. Thus 
well-being does not accumulate for them over their lifetimes, and they cannot grasp their 
life stories. So cows do not have a lifetime well-being level at all. This claim is supported 
by the following principle about intrinsic value, which I’ll call the Capacity to Care 
Condition: 
 
CCC:  Nothing can be intrinsically good or bad for an individual unless the individual 
has the capacity to care about it. 
 
Cows can care about what happens to them at a moment, but since they lack the capacity 
to see themselves as temporally extended beings, they cannot care about extended periods 
of their lives, or their whole lives. Thus their whole lives lack value for them, even if 
moments can be good or bad for them. 
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 The claim that extended periods of a cow’s life have no intrinsic value for the cow 
has bizarre implications.  Consider two possible futures for a cow.  In one future, the cow 
is tortured constantly until it dies.  In the other future, the cow is happy and free.  Which 
future is better for the cow?  If Velleman is right, neither future is better.  The second 
future has better moments for the cow, but on the whole, it is no better or worse than the 
first future.  That cannot be right.14  Velleman claims that given the truth of CCC, “any 
method of combining the values of a cow’s good and bad moments will be purely 
arbitrary and consequently defective” (1993, 356).  But could it really be arbitrary to 
suppose that when we combine the values of a cow’s bad moments, the result is as good 
as, or better than, the result of combining the values of the cow’s good moments?  Surely 
not all ways of combining momentary value are equally good. 
 We must, then, reject premise 3; we must reject the claim that a cow’s life has no 
intrinsic value for it, and must therefore reject CCC.  But there must be some reason 
Velleman finds CCC to be plausible. To see what this reason might be, let us make a 
distinction between two ways something can be intrinsically valuable. Sometimes when 
something is intrinsically valuable, its value is reducible. It is valuable because it is made 
up of some parts that are intrinsically valuable. For example: the happiness of the whole 
class is intrinsically valuable, but its value comes from the value of the happiness of each 
of the individuals in the class. On the other hand, sometimes the intrinsic value of 
something is irreducible. Perhaps the happiness of an individual is intrinsically valuable 
in a way that is not reducible to the value of its parts. (Or perhaps, in the case of an 
extended period of happiness, its value comes from the values of its temporal parts, 
which themselves have irreducible intrinsic value.)15 
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 Perhaps in order for something to be irreducibly intrinsically valuable for an 
individual, that individual must be able to care about it. Thus, in order for an individual’s 
whole life story to be irreducibly good for her (such as by being a story of improvement, 
or success, or redemption), she must be able to contemplate her whole life. A story of 
redemption or overcoming obstacles does not get its value from the intrinsic values of its 
parts, but from how the parts fit together to form a whole: an early misfortune, then some 
efforts to overcome it that are ultimately successful. However, it does not follow that in 
order for something to be reducibly intrinsically valuable for someone, she must be able 
to care about it. And in fact this seems implausible. Consider the happy class; it is good 
for the class to be happy, even the class does not or can not care about its happiness, and 
even if each individual in the class cares (or even can care) only about his or her own 
well-being. Just as well-being can aggregate across individuals even if the aggregate of 
individuals cannot care about its well-being, well-being can aggregate within an 
individual even if the individual cannot care about the aggregate well-being in its life. 
This enables us to say that cows have lifetime well-being levels, and so the life of torture 
is not just as good for the cow as the happy life.  Of course, there may still be one way in 
which cows’ lives cannot be good or bad for them: their lives cannot have the kind of 
value that comes from narrative structure (granting Velleman’s views about cow 
psychology). It is controversial whether narrative structure has any relevance to well-
being; but even if it does, it is surely not the only component of well-being, and not the 
only component of well-being that is relevant to the badness of death. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
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Those who wish to argue that death is not bad for a cow have two options: reject a 
deprivation account of death’s badness in favor of some other account that entails that 
death is not bad for cows, or claim that cows lack lifetime well-being levels and therefore 
the deprivation account cannot apply to them. Alternative accounts of death’s badness are 
either subject to fatal counterexamples (such as “categorical desire” accounts, which 
entail that death is not bad for babies), or do not entail that the death of a cow is not bad 
for the cow (such as McMahan’s “time-relative interest” account). Velleman’s argument 
that cows do not have lifetime well-being levels is based on a principle that has very 
implausible implications, and that can be replaced by another very similar principle that 
does not have those implications. I conclude that cows can have good lives, and death can 
be bad for them. 
This does not show that we are morally obligated not to eat hamburgers. An 
important question that I have not discussed at all here is whether cows have moral 
status, or moral rights.  It is consistent with what I have said here that although death is 
bad for cows, cows lack moral status, so the badness of their deaths does not matter 
morally. Nevertheless, I think it cannot be argued that turning happy cows into 
hamburgers is not bad for the cows.16 
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